

UNIT – 8**6 Hours**

Morphology: Basic morphological concepts, Morphology principles, Binary dilation and erosion, Gray-scale dilation and erosion, Morphological segmentation and watersheds

Text Books:

1. Milan Sonka, Vaclav Hlavac and Roger Boyle: Image Processing, Analysis and Machine Vision, 2nd Edition, Thomson Learning, 2001.
(Chapters 2, 4.1 to 4.3, 5.1 to 5.4, 6, 11.1 to 11.4, 11.7)
2. Rafael C Gonzalez and Richard E Woods: Digital Image Processing, 3rd Edition, Pearson Education, 2003.
(Chapters 3.1 to 3.7, 4.1 to 4.5, 8.1 to 8.5)

Reference Books:

1. Anil K Jain, “Fundamentals of Digital Image Processing”, PHI, 1997, Indian Reprint 2009.
2. B.Chanda, D Dutta Majumder, “Digital Image Processing and Analysis”, PHI, 2002.

GAME THEORY**Subject Code: 10IS763****I.A. Marks : 25****Hours/Week : 04****Exam Hours: 03****Total Hours : 52****Exam Marks: 100****PART - A****UNIT – 1****8 Hours**

Introduction, Strategic Games: What is game theory? The theory of rational choice; Interacting decision makers.

Strategic games; Examples: The prisoner’s dilemma, Bach or Stravinsky, Matching pennies; Nash equilibrium; Examples of Nash equilibrium; Best-response functions; Dominated actions; Equilibrium in a single population: symmetric games and symmetric equilibria.

UNIT – 2**6 Hours**

Mixed Strategy Equilibrium: Introduction; Strategic games in which players may randomize; Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium; Dominated actions; Pure equilibria when randomization is allowed, Illustration: Expert Diagnosis; Equilibrium in a single population, Illustration: Reporting a crime; The

formation of players' beliefs; Extensions; Representing preferences by expected payoffs.

UNIT – 3

6 Hours

Extensive Games: Extensive games with perfect information; Strategies and outcomes; Nash equilibrium; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Finding subgame perfect equilibria of finite horizon games; Backward induction. Illustrations: The ultimatum game, Stackelberg's model of duopoly, Buying votes.

UNIT – 4

6 Hours

Extensive games: Extensions and Discussions: Extensions: Allowing for simultaneous moves, Illustrations: Entry in to a monopolized industry, Electoral competition with strategic voters, Committee decision making, Exit from a declining industry; Allowing for exogenous uncertainty, Discussion: subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction.

PART – B

UNIT – 5

7 Hours

Bayesian Games, Extensive Games with Imperfect Information: Motivational examples; General definitions; Two examples concerning information; Illustrations: Cournot's duopoly game with imperfect information, Providing a public good, Auctions; Auctions with an arbitrary distribution of valuations.

Extensive games with imperfect information; Strategies; Nash equilibrium; Beliefs and sequential equilibrium; Signaling games; Illustration: Strategic information transmission.

UNIT – 6

7 Hours

Strictly Competitive Games, Evolutionary Equilibrium: Strictly competitive games and maximization; Maximization and Nash equilibrium; Strictly competitive games; Maximization and Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games.

Evolutionary Equilibrium: Monomorphic pure strategy equilibrium; Mixed strategies and polymorphic equilibrium; Asymmetric contests; Variations on themes: Sibling behavior, Nesting behavior of wasps, The evolution of sex ratio.

UNIT – 7

6 Hours

Iterated Games: Repeated games: The main idea; Preferences; Repeated games; Finitely and infinitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma; Strategies in an infinitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma; Some Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma, Nash equilibrium payoffs of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma.

UNIT – 8**6 Hours**

Coalitional Games and Bargaining: Coalitional games. The Core. Illustrations: Ownership and distribution of wealth, Exchanging homogeneous items, Exchanging heterogeneous items, Voting, Matching. Bargaining as an extensive game; Illustration of trade in a market; Nash's axiomatic model of bargaining

Text Books:

1. Martin Osborne: An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press, Indian Edition, 2004.
(Listed topics only from Chapters 1 to 11, 13, 14, 16)

Reference Books:

1. Roger B. Myerson: Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1997.
2. Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green: Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
3. Philip D. Straffin, Jr.: Game Theory and Strategy, The Mathematical Association of America, January 1993.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE**Subject Code: 10IS764****I.A. Marks : 25****Hours/Week : 04****Exam Hours: 03****Total Hours : 52****Exam Marks: 100****PART – A****UNIT – 1****7 Hours**

Introduction: What is AI? Intelligent Agents: Agents and environment; Rationality; the nature of environment; the structure of agents. Problem-solving: Problem-solving agents; Example problems; Searching for solution; Uninformed search strategies.

UNIT – 2**7 Hours**

Informed Search, Exploration, Constraint Satisfaction, Adversarial Search: Informed search strategies; Heuristic functions; On-line search agents and unknown environment. Constraint satisfaction problems; Backtracking search for CSPs. Adversarial search: Games; Optimal decisions in games; Alpha-Beta pruning.

UNIT – 3**6 Hours**